

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROCIB-D-15/3  
1 December 1959  
TAB B

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
COMMITTEE ON PROCUREMENT OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS  
EMERGENCY PLANNING

PROBLEM

To describe the responsibilities and operations of the Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications during an emergency.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That at least a portion of Headquarters activity has been relocated.
2. That the intelligence community continues to function.

DISCUSSION

1. In an emergency situation great disruption can be expected in the flow of foreign publications through normal channels. This disruption would be especially marked in the case of publications originating from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Some materials en route at the outbreak of the emergency, including many received through peripheral countries, would doubtless get through to the continental United States. However, it would almost certainly be impossible to place new requests for direct delivery of bloc publications after the outbreak.

2. During a period of limited emergency, when hostilities appear imminent, community activity to assure procurement of foreign publications would include confirmation of availability of alternate Relocation Sites; reviewing and up-dating rosters of procurement personnel, with current addresses, language ability, clerical skills, suitability for overseas duty, and similar information; placing "insurance" subscriptions through peripheral posts for carefully selected newspapers and journals; establishing order of succession for the Chairman and members of PROCIB; and designating a director of the Foreign Documents Center.

3. Immediately following the outbreak of a nuclear war, even the most elementary activities for the procurement and screening of foreign publications would probably be suspended. Available personnel would be assigned

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

more directly to the converting of finished, evaluated intelligence to answer immediate intelligence problems. Even if manpower were available for screening publications already received or in transit at the time of the outbreak, it is highly unlikely that analysts would be free to use the publications or that the type of information in open literature would be able to compete with finished intelligence for the attention of intelligence consumers. Exceptions might occur due to a concentration of language capability, knowledge that valuable information appears in a publication just issued, etc., but these would by no means set a pattern of operation until the situation had at least partially stabilized.

4. In the event of conventional warfare or the near normal aftermath of a nuclear attack, many sources of foreign publications should be tapped as soon as possible. Contact should be made with receiving points for State Department pouches and for commercial mail, and appropriate arrangements made to use, store, or dispose of such foreign publications as may have arrived. Postal authorities would probably be helpful in identifying receiving points still in operation and in suggesting patterns for diverting material to be received later.

5. Overseas procurement should be resumed as soon as staff and communications are available. Information on enemy countries and other areas of priority intelligence interest would appear in the regular press and the refugee press in neutral countries. Publications from denied areas would soon become available through the black market or might be openly available from refugees. Procurement activity at peripheral posts should be expanded, perhaps by the reassignment of Foreign Service and military personnel previously stationed within the target areas and therefore familiar with the current situation. It might also be advisable to station at such posts linguists or analysts from Headquarters or from other areas. Precedents from World War II include the press monitoring activity at Zurich and the gathering of Far Eastern materials in Paris as soon as it was reoccupied.

6. In wartime, another source of foreign publications would be by military capture. Although jurisdictionally outside the purview of PROCIB, this source will be considered briefly because of the need for close coordination of all procurement capabilities. In response to a JCS directive, the Joint Intelligence Committee prepared a manual describing the joint policies and procedures under which the Armed Services Document Intelligence Center (ASDIC) will operate. (See CONFIDENTIAL Joint Regulation SR 380-350-2 (Army) OPNAV Inst. 0386.3 (Navy), and AFOIN-C/DD 350.09 (Air Force), issued 6 July 1951 with the title "Military Security: Captured Enemy Documents.")

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the early stages of war, the flow of captured documents that could be sorted and shipped to the Zone of the Interior would probably be limited to items of immediate military significance. If a stalemate lasted for a period of months, the flow of captured documents would increase and screening procedures would doubtless make available appropriate publications for general intelligence exploitation. The non-military receiving point operating under the guidance of PROCIB would be well suited for sifting such publications so as to make most effective use of duplicate copies, and would also have the best available familiarity with Non-USIB requirements for foreign publications. The availability of some publications through ASDIC should not lead to the relaxing of efforts at procurement through non-military channels for the following reasons: (a) Military needs would probably receive priority attention at all ASDIC echelons; (b) most of the materials received via ASDIC would be quite different in content from the normal flow of foreign publications; (c) There would be no way of predicting with certainty the availability via ASDIC of any particular title or type of publication.

7. Means of procurement would be varied in an emergency, even more than during normal times. State Department channels would continue to be used as appropriate. Consideration should be given to the use of civilians in uniform with simulated rank, who could make arrangements for travel, billeting, etc., far more readily than civilians in mufti. The independent procurement activities of book dealers, libraries, and private individuals might fill gaps in Governmental procurement. In a national emergency such organizations as the Association of Research Libraries, the American Library Association, the American Booksellers Association, and the several academic groups concerned with regional research resources could be of great help in providing prompt access to a significant flow of foreign publications, both through such commercial channels as might still be functioning and through their overseas counterparts.

8. There will be many complexities involved in the shipping, receipt, handling and distribution of the publications. Communications with the field would call for prompt but careful phrasing in a constantly changing situation. All these and related problems will have to be taken care of in the implementation of the proposed Plan.

9. Coordination of civilian and military procurement in a rapidly changing situation would require forceful management, under the policy guidance of PROCIB or some other representative group. Non-USIB agencies would probably continue to name representatives to PROCIB, as in peace time, to assure appropriate disposition of publications not exclusively or urgently needed by USIB agencies. A director of publication procurement might serve as the executive agent of PROCIB. With adequate operational

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

leadership much committee activity could be done remotely by memorandum or telephone rather than by formal meeting.

10. Further progress in emergency planning by this Committee will be difficult until the following areas are clarified:

a. Relocation Site. The availability of a hardened site for relocation has not been confirmed. Guidance will be needed if it is decided to designate in advance alternative sites which are either partially hardened or sufficiently dispersed to give good likelihood that one would be operable relatively soon following a nuclear attack.

b. Stand-by Personnel. Realistic provision should be made for operating without the personnel now stationed in Washington, D.C. Individuals in similar activities could be briefed in general terms and might even be brought to Washington on "active duty" for one or two weeks each year.

c. Instruction Kits. If operations are contemplated at some distance from Washington this would suggest that untrained or partially trained persons might be at least temporarily in charge. They would need summary information on sources, procedures, channels of communication, etc.

d. Money. Attention is called to the fact that almost all further preparation for operations in an emergency would require outlays of money by the agencies involved. This aspect of emergency planning is outside the purview of PROCIB responsibilities.

e. Re-planning. This Committee, like most others, is heavily dependent on the resources and plans of its members and other committees. For example, any decision modifying the responsibilities or location of ASDIC would be of very great concern to PROCIB.

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. During a nuclear attack or immediately following the outbreak of any type of war involving the United States, it would not be feasible to initiate action for the procurement of foreign publications; procurement activity during this period would be limited to highly selective sorting and distributing of such priority publications as were received as a result of previously initiated procurement action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Based on experience during World War II, foreign publications would be essential to the intelligence effort in an extended emergency and could be effectively obtained only by forceful and coordinated policy direction from a committee such as PROCIB, empowered to discuss needs and capabilities of the departments and agencies for the procurement of foreign publications.

3. Close coordination among various channels of procurement, notably ASDIC and the Department of State would be essential.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the attached Plan for Procurement of Foreign Publications under Emergency Conditions be approved by the United States Intelligence Board.

2. That the departments and agencies concerned with foreign publications include in their emergency planning provision for requesting and receiving foreign publications, and, as appropriate, for assigning personnel to the Foreign Publications Center or to field procurement teams.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~